capacity to meet demands might have little if any effect on mobilization; on the other hand, that capacity itself might be more a function of nonpolitical variables--such as the level of economic development and economic growth rates--than of the political variables Kitschelt identifies.
Although political opportunity structure is a conceptual construct and not something observable, the constituent political forces are more closely tied to discernible social reality. Accordingly, political opportunity structures can be said to be objective phenomena, especially from the standpoint of observers and organizers external to the group itself. Still, mobilization and action are mediated by perception; therefore, these structures are also subjective, particularly when the perspective is that of the group itself. Consequently, political factors that facilitate/inhibit the perception of opportunities for collective action are part of the structure of political opportunities, as well. •5 In the following sections, each of these five components of the political opportunity structure will be utilized to analyze peasant mobilization in contemporary Central America, to be followed by an evaluation of the usefulness of this approach itself. First, though, the next section will give a brief background of the case material.
Peasant Grievances in Central America
Central America entered the post-World War II period with rural structures that were grossly unequal and exploitative. Most of the rural population lived on small subsistence plots, while most of the private land was owned by a small percentage of the landholders. Pressure on land supply already existed in El Salvador and in the most densely settled portions of the other countries, especially the western highlands of Guatemala. Because much of the region's land is not suitable for cultivation and because population has grown at rapid rates, eventually population growth alone would have created land scarcity everywhere. But this has not been the only force with which peasants have had to contend.
As a result of the acceleration of the commercialization of agriculture, traditional agricultural structures and practices changed substantially in recent decades. Haciendas became commercial farms as new incentives encouraged established landowners and new investors to pursue new opportunities for financial gain. Sharecroppers became wage laborers, while commercial enterprises devoted to new export commodities, such as cotton, sugar, and beef, spread throughout the countryside. Similarly, small and medium size farms producing for urban markets became more commonplace.'6 Underlying the mobilization of the Central American peasantry, then, has been a transformation of the class structure and a further integration of the countryside in the international market, as analysts such as Skocpol and Wolf would have us note.'7 Peasant mobilization usually originated in areas where the conversion of land to the production of commercial export crops promoted the expulsion of subsistence peasants from land they had cultivated, often for decades and even generations. For example, sustained peasant political activity in Honduras started in the early 1960s on the north coast in response to land disputes with a United Fruit Company subsidiary and was encouraged by the example of the Cuban revolution.'8 As tensions escalated later in the decade, organizations were formed to lead occupations of lands from which peasants claimed they had been illegitimately evicted.
The consequences of the commercialization of agriculture for peasant mobilization in Central America varied among the countries of the region because of differences among them in factors such as preexisting rural class structures, ethnic heterogeneity, state penetration, land scarcity, and the importance of the agricultural sector. Prior to the twentieth century, different patterns of export agriculture existed in the region due to variations in the availability of exportable crops, land, labor, and capital. 19 The expansion of the production of crops such as indigo and coffee in the past resulted in the greatest losses for peasants in Guatemala and El Salvador. The powerful often relied on coercion to obtain the land and labor they required, especially if the peasants were Indians (more likely in these two countries, especially the first). Consequently, Guatemala and El Salvador entered the contemporary period with the most exploitative and coercive rural class structures. Similar dynamics occurred in Nicaragua, but less extensively. In contrast, coffee growing spread in Costa Rica with little coercion and under more egalitarian circumstances. Export agriculture had little impact on rural class relations in Honduras (with the exception of the isolated banana enclaves) until recent decades.20
There are significant differences in the degree of inequality built into the contemporary agrarian structures of Central America. These differences, though, are missed by some indicators. A gross measure such as the Gini index of land concentration, for example, shows virtually no differences among the five countries.21 Table 1 provides a set of alternative measures of rural inequality and of economic insecurity. As measured by cropped Taken together, these empirical indicators substantiate the notable differences in the agrarian structures of the Central American countries. They can be best grouped into three sets. El Salvador and Guatemala clearly are a distinct set with the worst land scarcity and polarization of land ownership combined with sizable populations employed in agriculture. Although certainly serious, the land problem has not been as bad in Honduras and especially Nicaragua. However, the commercialization of agriculture began earlier and was more thorough in Nicaragua than in Honduras, creating a substantial landless population.23 The final category is Costa Rica. Its rural population has been subjected to many of the same pressures as those elsewhere. But, with the lowest rates of rural poverty and polarization of land ownership, with the smallest agriculture-based population, and with the least experience with land expulsions, Costa Rica has had significantly lower levels of grievances and mobilization than the rest of the region. Consequently, in the following sections Costa Rica will receive little attention.
The deterioration of material conditions and the loss of economic security following from the structural transformation of Central American agriculture provided the objective conditions and the grievances for peasant mobilization. Montes claims that for El Salvador, for example, such conditions were clearly present by 1973 and became even more so as the decade progressed.24 On the other hand, as Montes argues, there was little subjective readiness early in the decade.25 That readiness was prompted by a changing structure of political opportunities, in interaction with escalating grievances.
Support Groups and Expanding Opportunities
The importance of allies and support groups to the mobilization of groups lacking political power is well-established by studies such as those of U.S. farm workers26 and the U.S. civil rights movement.7 Their importance to peasant mobilization is also one of the important contributions of those writing from a political economy perspective.28 Successful peasant mobilization requires, at a minimum, two changes in social relations. First, traditional patronage relationships must be weakened since they are the personalized manifestation of peasants' subordination within the status quo. Second, preexisting ties of solidarity among the peasants must be strengthened or new ties forged. Outside organizers not only provide organizational expertise, but also offer alternative sources of economic assistance and protection to the domination of traditional patrons.29 Without such assistance, or with too insubstantial assistance, the politically weak are too vulnerable to usually risk overt protest and confrontation.30 Support groups and allies, then, are "catalysts for change"31 because they alter the structure of political opportunities.32 What is important here about such groups is not their intentions but rather the consequences of their actions for the constellation of power relations surrounding the peasantry.
Outside agents-such as religious workers, union organizers, revolutionary guerrillas, political party activists, and development workers-have been critical to the political changes of recent decades in rural Central America. One of the most important of the new political forces in rural Central America has been church workers. Often with easier access and legitimacy than other actors because of shared religious beliefs and, for priests, because of their status, church workers in each country have played a central role in peasant mobilization.33 Especially notable were the influence of Catholic Action and foreign missionaries in Guatemala, the church radio school program in Honduras, and base communities in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Whether these efforts were directly religious, developmental, or political, they often served to foster the transformation of attitudes from fatalistic to activistic and to create new organizations to nurture this transformation and to facilitate its expression. Eventually, peasants supported by this process took the lead in asserting their rights to a better life, participating in demonstrations, marches, and land invasions. The importance of this role can be illustrated with the example of Guatemala, which is probably less familiar than the cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua but certainly not less significant. 34 Catholic Action was begun in Guatemala in 1946 by the church hierarchy as a conservative reaction to the changes catalyzed by the reforms of a new progressive government. Life in Indian villages had been grounded in religious beliefs and practices that combined Catholicism with pre-Columbian religion. A major purpose of Catholic Action was to further the Christian conversion of Indians by attacking and undermining indigenous "superstitions." However, the message was taken into rural areas by missionaries who did not always share the perspective of the hierarchy. Furthermore, as Indians rejected some traditional religious beliefs, they also freed themselves from the conservative authority of traditional religious leaders and societies. This "liberation" made them available for later mobilization by change-oriented forces from the outside. These catechists were also the agents for the further diffusion of Catholic Action into more remote rural areas.
If the catechists rejected some of their native customs, they did not reject their Indian heritage. 35 Studies found that Catholic Action fostered in the new converts, usually younger Indians, a group consciousness that encouraged them to see "themselves as 'apostles' carrying the new 'social gospel' of the Catholic Church to their less fortunate Indian brothers and sisters."36 Consequently, the conversion process promoted by Catholic Action attacked not only the traditional Indian hierarchy, but also the system of social control benefitting Ladinos (non-Indians). While traditionalists worried about maintaining good ties with their Ladino patrones, the catechists "tend to see such relationships as repressive and exploitative, blocking the progress of Indians and the leveling of the two ethnic groups."37 Freed from traditional restrictions and nonmaterialist explanations for their deprivation and inferior status, the new converts were often the leaders of new peasant organizations. The first fifty members of a peasant league in El Quiche discussed by Falla, for example, were all Catholic Action converts. 38 Reinforcing these efforts were the activities of the Christian Democratic Party, which had close ties to Catholic Action. Organizers from the party established local affiliates of the national party, encouraged supporters to run for local offices, and helped to organize peasant leagues and cooperatives. Furthermore, the party was critical to the achievement by Indians of political power on the local level. 39 Historically, few Indian communities had been served by priests. In order to promote Catholic Action, and to meet the challenge of Protestant missionaries, foreign priests were now welcomed to Guatemala. The concerns of many of these priests, though, went beyond religious conversion. In the northern portion of the Indian department of Huehuetenango, for example, Maryknolls from North America established a presence in most villages by the early 1960s and converted thousands of Indians. But their efforts were also addressed to rural development, including schools, clinics, and credit cooperatives. In response to government inaction in face of the serious land pressures in the highlands, the religious workers initiated their own colonization project in the late 1960s in the underpopulated Ixcain region of the far north of the department (and country). Most important, the foreign church workers gave significant attention to the development of indigenous leaders, not only to carry out these projects, but also to take the reformist social message into the most remote Indian villages.4?
The church workers were not alone in their efforts. Rural development projects also were initiated by foreign governments and private organizations, including the United States A further regime effort at maintaining rural order through peasant organization was also initiated during the mid 1960s with the formation of the Democratic Nationalist Organization (ORDEN). Although its membership grew to about 100,000 rural people, it is usually claimed that all but about 5 to 10 percent had joined only as a means of self-protection. 43 ORDEN functioned as a large auxiliary to the National Guard for maintaining rural order and as an instrument of repression for which the regime could -hypocritically--deny complicity."
In contrast to such organizations, whose rationale was the maintenance of the system, a number of more autonomous organizations with the purpose of pressing forth peasant demands were organized. Fundamental to their formation and growth were the efforts of political activists, such as union organizers, political party activists, progressive students, and revolutionary guerrillas. FENACH in Honduras, for example, was formed with the assistance of leaders who had settled in the area after having been fired by United Fruit following an important strike in 1954. Its successes in organizing land invasions/recoveries, though, were short-lived. After the civilian government was overthrown in 1963, FENACH was destroyed; the leaders who were caught were jailed, its offices and archives were demolished, and its membership repressed.
In Space does not permit even a sketchy discussion of changes in political access in each country. Instead, its importance will be illustrated with the cases of Nicaragua and Honduras.
In contrast to the intransigence and repression of the Somoza regime, peasant organization in Nicaragua received substantial support from the Sandinistas during the struggle against the dictatorship and in the months after the revolutionary victory of July 1979. 47 The Association of Rural Workers (ATC), which played an important role in the struggle against Somoza in the Pacific coastal area, received much organizational assistance from both the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and a Jesuit-backed organization. After the revolution and before 1979 was over, the membership of the ACT had reached 59,000; by June 1980, it was about 120,000 members. In 1981 it was split, with the National Union of Farmers and Cattle Ranchers (UNAG) formed to represent small and medium producers, leaving rural wage earners as the base of the ATC.48 A notable sign of the access to policymakers enjoyed by these organizations was the substantial role they played in the formulation of the Agrarian Reform Law, which was promulgated in July 1981. As peasant frustrations mounted in the following years, these organizations were able to press forth their demands, not only through the presentation of evidence and arguments, but also through demonstrations. The government responded to these demands, especially in 1985 when the pace of land redistribution accelerated and changes also were enacted to provide more attractive incentives to rural workers and producers.
In The political opportunity structure facing Central American peasants in recent decades has varied widely because of great differences in governmental reliance on repression. It also had differed historically. The elites of Guatemala and El Salvador had been more likely to utilize coercion in the past to obtain the land and labor they desired for their economic enterprises and to rely on repression to keep those structures in place. The point here is twofold. First, the agrarian class structures of these two countries were more exploitative than in the other countries and were protected by more elaborate and extensive repressive institutions. Accordingly, any mass mobilization in these two countries would be perceived by elites (correctly) as more of a fundamental threat. Second, given the scope of the violence that had been used in the past, elites would be more likely to believe that violence was an acceptable and effective response to any perceived threats in the present. Repression, though, does not have an invariant impact on mobilization. Indiscriminate repression can antagonize as many people into action as it neutralizes.59 The regime violence of the 1970s in El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as in Nicaragua, provoked further popular resistance, rather than beating the population back into submission. The reliance on unjustified violence stiffened the resolve of many who were already in opposition and delegitimized the regime for many others, many of whom were politicized and radicalized. Increasing numbers of peasants gave their support to the growing revolutionary armies, many becoming participants themselves. As terrible as it was, at this stage the repression was not sufficient to protect the regimes of these three countries. Consequently, the violence was escalated. The application of systematic state terrorism from 1980 to 1983 in El Salvador and to 1984 in Guatemala accomplished, for the time, its purpose. Although revolutionary forces continue their struggles in both countries, the tens of thousands of murders in each country were sufficient to destroy popular organizations and restore fear and passivity in much of the countryside.60 In Nicaragua in contrast, Somoza's willingness even to destroy the nation's cities with his air force was not sufficient to save his regime. During the final battles of the civil war his forces killed on levels approaching those of the other two countries but, unlike in the other two, his personalistic dictatorship had alienated all sectors of society and had not developed the institutional capacity to implement state terrorism on the same systematic level. 61 Duvall and Stohl point out that the propensity to rely on state terrorism is determined not only by self-imposed constraints on violence as an instrument of governance, but also by "the perceptual social distance between the government and the victim population.'"62 On a class basis this social distance is the most pronounced in Guatemala and El Salvador, with their more polarized class structures. More important, though, is ethnic heterogeneity. The people most likely to be victims of state terrorism in Central America in recent decades have been the Indians of Guatemala's western highlands-the contemporary manifestation of the racism that stretches back to the liberal reforms of the nineteenth century and back further to the Conquest.
Elite Fragmentation and Conflict
Organizations asserting the claims of the disadvantaged invariably confront a formidable array of elite interests. When political, military, and economic elites are cohesive, the political opportunities for challengers are usually minimal; as elites fragment and come into conflict, opportunities open; in rare cases, elite fragmentation and conflict contribute to a regime crisis so severe as to allow for a revolutionary outcome.63 This component of the structure of political opportunities is clearly as complex as it is critical. First, the salient elites might not only be domestic but also include those of a hegemonic power, such as the United States when the subject is Central America. Second, elite fragmentation and conflict are dimensions that can and do vary independently with differential implications for collective action.64 For example, a situation of medium to high elite fragmentation would probably facilitate the mobilization of the disadvantaged, but if combined with low elite conflict there would be a low probability for significant changes in the distribution of power and resources. In the opposite situation, low elite fragmentation would not be as conducive to popular mobilization, but medium to high elite conflict would create the possibility of a higher payoff for the disadvantaged than would the first situation. The resolution of this low elite fragmentation/high conflict situation would in turn be substantially determined by the third major aspect of elite alignments to be considered here, the pattern of elite-state relations.65 A cohesive elite dominating the state presents potential challengers with a discouraging situation, certainly more so than a state with some measure of autonomy from dominant economic elites. In summary, the central point is this: as elite and elite-state alignments vary, so do the opportunities for challengers to assert their claims and to gain favorable outcomes.
There 
Location in the Protest Cycle
The final component of the structure of political opportunities to be isolated here is temporal location in the "cycle of protest." As Tarrow has demonstrated in a number of his works, collective action often occurs in the larger context of a protest cycle, a temporal location with significant implications for challengers.71 Protest cycles are characterized by the diffusion of conflict throughout society at levels of frequency and intensity that are higher than normal. This activity builds, peaks, and then declines back to more normal levels.72
Generally, a challenger asserting its claims on the upswing of the cycle will fare better than those late in the cycle or after its completion. During the upswing of a cycle, many groups and movements will be asserting their claims, placing greater pressure on the system to respond to demands than any could individually. Systems and their elites, though, adapt only so far; short of revolutionary transformations, responsiveness declines and repressive measures become more likely. Challenges made late in the cycle or afterwards face a less favorable opportunity structure. 73 It might be argued that the cycle of protest is not really a component of the structure of political opportunities but rather is a description of the opening and closing of the political opportunity structure itself. Such a view would be mistaken. As Tarrow The analytic utility of the cycle of protest for the Central American cases, however, is another matter. In each of the three cases noted above, repression ended the cycle while it was still building, especially in El Salvador and Guatemala. Accordingly, the full dynamics of the cycle described by Tarrow were not allowed to develop. Although he does discuss the role of repression as part of the downward swing of the cycle, in Italy repression was occasional and highly specific to small groups outside of the mainstream of political life. The same is also true of the ending of the civil rights protests of the 1960s in the United States. 75 In contrast, repression in Central America had been directed at the heart of social movements, and in El Salvador and Guatemala across society. In these two cases repression led to the deaths of tens of thousands of noncombatants in order to bring the cycle of protest to an abrupt end.76 Repression also played an important role in Nicaragua; indeed, it could be argued that a true cycle of protest was never able to unfold because of repression. Accordingly, many challengers adopted an insurrectional strategy, one that was not continual but rather episodic.
These considerations suggest that, although temporal location in the cycle of protest can be an important component of the structure of political opportunities for institutionalized polyarchical systems, it will be less significant in systems where both meaningful popular access to the political system and the rule of law are not institutionalized. In systems such as those of Central America (excluding Costa Rica), elites are still able to end popular mobilization through widespread repression when the level of protest too seriously threatens their interests.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study has been to bring together under the concept of the structure of political opportunities a variety of political factors that scholars have found to be relevant in explaining the origins and the course of popular mobilization. It is now time to assess the results. Conclusions will be presented for the utility of this framework for differentiating the determinants and fate of peasant mobilization within the five countries of Central America, as well as for the determinants of the country differences themselves.
The involvement of support groups and allies from outside of peasant communities was a factor of supreme importance throughout Central America. They were usually critical to the mobilization of peasants and the development of peasant organizations, in part because of their organizational skills and activist value system, but especially because their presence and activities altered the configuration of power in the countryside. They offered alternative sources of economic assistance and protection to peasants directly and through their links to urban and international groups. Analytically, though, this component of the structure of political opportunities was not useful in distinguishing country differences because this study is at too general a level of analysis. This component would be more useful analytically, the more detailed the discussion and the more specific the level of inquiry (for example, in comparing the fates of individual peasant movements as opposed to the entire peasant sector, as here). The same is true for the protest cycle, the final component of the political opportunity structure confronting groups. Temporal location in the cycle of protest is an important variable for the fate of individual organizations but is of little utility for comparison at more general levels of analysis. Furthermore, and regardless of the level of analysis, this component seems to be more salient in the analysis of collective action in institutionalized democracies than in countries where widespread repression closes access to the political system and undermines the rule of law.
In contrast, the three regime-related components emerge as powerful determinants of differences in mobilization at all levels of analysis, from individual groups to the entire peasant sector, whether compared over time within one country or between countries. Elite fragmentation and conflict create opportunities for mass mobilization. In countries without institutionalized civilian polyarchical rule, officials committed to democratization open access to the political system to the extent that they are successful in their project, directly by creating opportunities for mass politics and indirectly by facilitating the activities of outside support groups. When some elite groups share some objectives with popular forces, these forces are energized, and the possibilities for success are enhanced, even leading in rare occasions to a successful revolutionary outcome, such as in Nicaragua. Elites, though, are usually not so fragmented; instead, mass mobilization leads to perceptions of threat by elites. As the perception of threat increases, elite differences usually are minimized, and repression follows. The severity and success of repression, however, is determined not just by the level of threat perceived, but also by the capacity and propensity for repression.
Although each of these components of the political opportunity structure has been important to peasant mobilization in all of the countries under study here, the configuration of their relative significance varies between countries. In El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, propensity and capacity for repression must be regarded as the crucial factor differentiating them from the other two countries. Once popular mobilization was perceived as a serious threat, regimes responded with massive repression. In El Salvador and Nicaragua, however, elite fragmentation and conflict led to different outcomes than in Guatemala, where the military had a firmer hold on state power and faced fewer constraints from other elites. Honduras is not distinguished from these three countries by lower levels of peasant mobilization--indeed, Honduran peasant mobilization was easily the equivalent of the others prior to the onset in those three of widespread repression. Instead, Honduras was distinct in the lower propensity of state actors to utilize repression, as well as a lesser capacity until the 1980s. Access to policymakers also was a more important determinant in Honduras; at several points peasants enjoyed greater access than in the other three (with the exception of revolutionary Nicaragua). The loss of this access stifled further action and reduced or ended positive outcomes. The institutionalized polyarchical system of Costa Rica affords the peasantry of that country better access, but the levels of peasant organization and mobilization have been lower than in the rest of the region because of the smaller size of the peasant sector and because its grievances are less intense.
As for the determinants of these country differences in the structure of political opportunity facing peasant mobilization, they have fundamentally been the consequence of resource availability (especially land) and preexisting agrarian structures.77 Generally, Costa Rica and Honduras had less repressive structures to begin with as well as less resource constraints on the ability of willing governments to meet peasant demands for land. Although serious agrarian problems remain in both countries, relative to the other three regime responsiveness (and "mild" repression in Honduras) has been sufficient to hold rural grievances below the level where they would represent a serious threat to the maintenance of the system.
In Guatemala in the early 1950s, the underutilized lands of the United Fruit Company and of national farms were sufficient to allow a major redistribution without attacking large-scale commercial agriculture. By the 1970s, though, land pressures due to both the further expansion of commercial agriculture and population growth in Guatemala, as well as El Salvador, intensified elite opposition to any serious consideration of land reform or other needs of the peasantry. Given that both systems were based on highly exploitative labor systems, intensifying land pressures heightened the probability that peasant mobilization would be experienced as an intolerable threat to the existing system. The pattern of state-class relations insured that the necessary coercive measures would be taken to eliminate that threat. In Nicaragua, however, land pressures were not as acute, nor was the labor system as coercive (speaking only relatively). Furthermore, the landowning class had been preempted from exercising state power by the Somoza dynasty. These are some of the reasons why the agrarian bourgeoisie in Nicaragua did not at first experience the popular mobilization there as the same degree of threat perceived by its counterparts in Guatemala and El Salvador. When the revolution triumphed, Sandinista ideology preordained the championing of peasant interests, but it was the virtual automatic creation of a substantial public agrarian sector with the flight of the Somocistas that allowed them to do so at relatively little economic or political cost.
As the 1980s drew to a close in Central America, peasant grievances against the allocation of benefits within the existing sociopolitical order remained widespread. It would be impossible to predict with any certainty the future direction of peasant movements in the region and the outcome of their efforts. What this study has established, though, is that the structure of political opportunities will be a primary determinant of the fates of these movements. As peasants attempt to redirect public policy, their efforts will be constrained or facilitated by the availability of allies and support groups, by the degree of access to policymakers, by the amount of fragmentation and conflict among elites, by the state's capacity and propensity for repression, and by their temporal location in a cycle of protest.
